Representative Image: A tourist look out of a panoramic view of the desert in Wadi Rum, Jordan, Middle East.War introduces distance — psychological, commercial, and logistical — between travellers and destinations. When armed conflict erupts, it is quickly reinforced by government travel advisories, negative media cycles, airline capacity cuts, and rising casualty figures. The result is predictable: travellers move away from conflict zones, not towards them. Yet the long-term implications for tourism are more complex than an immediate drop in arrivals, particularly in a region as interconnected as the Middle East.
This complexity was evident in the post-pandemic recovery. Following the collapse of global travel during COVID-19, the Middle East emerged as the world’s fastest-recovering tourism region, becoming the only region to surpass pre-pandemic international arrival levels by 2023. Strong air connectivity, aggressive destination marketing, and diversified source markets positioned the region ahead of Europe and Asia. That momentum, however, was disrupted by the outbreak of war in October 2023.
Aviation passenger data reveals the re-emergence of what analysts describe as “two MENAs”: a divergence between GCC and non-GCC Middle Eastern markets. While the MENA region overall still recorded an estimated 7% annual growth in passenger arrivals, the impact of conflict was highly uneven. Non-GCC Middle Eastern economies — geographically and perceptually closer to the conflict — experienced negative monthly growth between October 2023 and October 2024. In contrast, GCC countries and North Africa continued to post positive growth, albeit at a slower pace, underscoring the role of perceived proximity to instability rather than actual security conditions.
European travel patterns further illustrate this substitution effect. During the first nine months of 2024, non-GCC Middle Eastern destinations received 2.35 million fewer European visitors compared to the same period in 2023, while North Africa attracted 2.75 million additional European arrivals. For travellers and tour operators alike, destinations offering similar cultural and leisure experiences — but located further from active conflict — became preferred alternatives.
At the destination level, the impact on traveller sentiment was stark. Israel saw an immediate freeze in inbound leisure, pilgrimage, and MICE travel as airlines reduced services and advisories escalated. Bethlehem’s religious tourism virtually disappeared, highlighting the vulnerability of niche, emotionally driven segments. Jordan, despite internal stability, suffered heavily from spillover effects as Petra and other attractions were dropped from multi-country itineraries once Israel was removed, demonstrating how regional packaging can amplify negative sentiment.
Egypt experienced a more mixed outcome. While Red Sea resorts and Nile cruises remained far from hostilities, initial booking softness and cruise itinerary rerouting reflected heightened traveller sensitivity to regional risk and operational reliability. The escalation between Israel and Iran further compounded uncertainty through airspace closures and flight disruptions, shifting traveller focus from destination appeal to connectivity and predictability.
Importantly, demand did not vanish from the Middle East — it redistributed. Destinations perceived as politically insulated, operationally resilient, and globally connected, particularly the UAE, benefited from their positioning as safe hubs. For the travel trade, the lesson is clear: in periods of geopolitical tension, tourism performance hinges not only on attractions and pricing, but on confidence, connectivity, and perception management.
As conflict continues to shape travel behaviour, the industry must grapple with a broader question: beyond safety considerations, should political context and ethical awareness increasingly factor into how travellers — and the trade itself — plan, package, and promote destinations affected by war?
